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Why was the Fed so inflationary in 1965-79?  No single explanation suffices. 
Forecast errors and poor operating procedures played at'  most a minor role. 
Unwillingness to accept greater interest-rate variation and cognitive errors played a 
greater role.  Political pressures also played a role, but, given its desired policy the 
Fed was not greatly constrained by them.  Wage and price controls played an 
uncertain role.  The most important factor was the prevailing intellectual 
atmosphere with its de-emphasis on the costs of  inflation, its faith in the viability of 
an inflation/unemployment trade-off and concern with cost-push elements. WHY WAS THE FED SO INFLATIONARY IN  THE 1960s AND 1970s? 
Thomas Mayer 
The inflation starting around 1965 was  the greatest failure of American macroeconomic policy 
in  the postwar period. As  Figure 1 show!$, the United States had experienced substantial 
inflations before, but all of  them had  been connected with a major war. Up  until 1965 one 
could reasonably have argued that the United States was immune to serious peace-time 
mflation. 
In  the 1970s the price level rose more than in any other decade in  the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The years of the Great Inflation, as this inflation is often called, also differed 
sharply from the immediately preceding years. From 1952 to 1964 the CPI rose at an average 
rate of  1.3 percent; in  only two of  these thirteen years did the inflation rate exceed 2 percent. 
By contrast, in the nine years, 1973-19811 the inflation rate averaged 9.2 percent, with a peak 
of  13.3 percent in 1979. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, until the early 1980s the inflation rate 
accelerated; in each peak of  the inflation cycle it was  higher than the preceding peak, and  in 
each trough it was  higher than the previous trough. It is  therefore not surprising that in  1979 
there was a flight from the dollar, not only into foreign currencies but also into gold, silver 
and even diamonds. 
The two oil shocks obviously played a major role. But as Figure 2 illustrates something 
more was  involveld because the inflation rate had already started to rise substantially prior to 
the first oil shock. That cannot be explained as an unsurprising result of  the Vietnam War. As 
Figure 3 demonstrates defense expenditures as a percent of  GDP were higher in the early 
1950s than in the mid-1960s, and were on a downward course from the late 1960s until the 
1980s. The Vietnam War may  bear some indirect responsibility for the Great Inflation, but one 
cannot tell a story in  which large military expenditures caused the inflation through the usual 
channels stressed by  macroeconon~ics.  Nor does the piling of  Great Society programs on top  OF 
war expenditures provide a straightforward explanation. The deficits were much larger in the 
1980s when the inflation rate fell. 
Since it is clear that the inflation could not have become anywhere near as virulent as did had the monetary growth rate bee:n much lower, and since a high  monetary growth rate is a 
necessary condition for a major inflation, it  is  useful to treat the Fed's policy as the  "cause" of 
the inflation. That does not necessarily imply that it was the "fundamental cause", or that therl- 
were no other causes. 
I start my  analysis with 1965. The terminal date has ragged edges. Since the focus is  on 
the Fed's policy and not on the inflation rate, I terminate most of  the discussion in March 
1976, after which  I  no longer have the FOMC's Minutes available. Some part of  the discussing 
that does not require the Minutes I carry forward to October 1979. 
I. AVAIL.ABLE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS 
Two theoretical frameworks are often used to explain inflations, time-inconsistency theory and 
public choice theory.  I have used  neither. The time-inconsistency theory of  monetary policy 
consists of a set of  models that generate different predictions depending upon the specific, and 
essentially arbitrary assumptions made. 
Public choice theory fails to explain what central bankers gain from inflation. On the most 
obvious level they lose since their salaries are likely to lag behind inflation. And  although by 
adopting expansionary policies they avoid - in the short run - blame for rising interest rates and 
for high unemployment, in the longer run they are likely to be blamed for the resulting 
inflation and the high nominal interest rates. A possible response is that central bankers are not 
the ones who reallv make monetary policy, that the thrust of  monetary policy is determined by 
their political masters. But  it  is  far from obvious that politicians benefit all that much from 
inflation. Besides, if  the political process drives the Fed to be so inflationary, why did that 
manifest itself only from 1965 to  1979? 
I have also not used of  Fed reaction function. As  John Wood (1967) has shown, the 
regression coefficients of  such a reaction function should not be interpreted as indicators of  tht: 
relative importance that the Fed attributes to various goals.2 Second, as Salva Khoury (1986, 
1990) has shown, Fed reaction functions are highly fragile. 
For these reasons I worked on a much lower level of, abstraction by reading through the 
FOMC Minutes and by  interviewing eleven former FOMC officials and two former CEA chairmen.  In setting out the results  [ start by seeing whether the inflationary policy might have 
been due to forecast errors. I then look at the Fed's operating procedures, as well as the 
certain cognitive errors that the Fed made:. After that I consider political pressures and the 
effect of wage - price controls before turning to what I think is the most important cause, the 
prevailing intellectual atmosphere. 
11. THE FOMC'S FORECASTS 
Table 1 shows the forecast errors for four variables, the GNP deflator, real GNP, the 
unemployment rate, and nominal defense expenditures. The reason for including defense 
expenditures is that the Johnson administration systematically  understated future defense 
expenditures, and that might have caused the staff's GNP and inflation forecasts to be 
downward biased. Since the major supply shocks may be responsible for forecast errors Table 
1 shows the errors (except for defense expenditures) both including and excluding the 
1973.1-74.3 period. 
As Table 1 shows except for the current quarter, most of which was over by the time the 
FOMC meeting, the staff underestimated the GNP deflator. To put this underestimate into a 
meaningful context one can compare it to the 121 percent rise in  the GDP deflator between 
1965 and 1979.  Here are the figures for all the quarters: 
Quarters ahead  Forecast error as percent of 
1  total inflation, 1965-79 
7  -  18 
3  19 
4  20 
Suppose the FOMC had not underestimated the inflation rate, how much less would the 
GDP deflator have risen? One extreme assumption is that the FOMC had a rigid inflation 
target and hence would have responded to a higher estimate of inflation by adopting 
sufficiently restrictive policies to bring the inflation rate down to this target. In this case the 
inflation rate would have been 16 to 20 percent lower. The alternative extreme assumption is 
that even if  the FOMC had estimated the inflation rate correctly it would have pursued the 
policy it actually did. Obviously, the truth lies in-between, but there is no way of determining 
exactly where. The staff also overestimated the growth rate of real GNP, as well as the unemployment 
rate. That the FOMC expected real GNP to grow faster than it did may have generated a bias 
towards a restrictive policy. But that it expected unemployment to be higher than it was should 
have induced a bias towards an expansionary policy. The latter bias may well have outweighed 
the former, because at least those FOMC members who were not professional economists are 
likely to have had a more definite opinion about the acceptable level of unemployment than 
about the acceptable rate of real GNP growth. 
All in all, most of the Fed's highly inflationary policy cannot be attributed errors in 
forecasting real GDP, the inflation rate, unemployment or defense expenditures. 
111.  OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Monetarists as well as others have rightly criticized the Fed's operating procedures of the 
1960s and 1970s. But these money-market-condition (MMC) procedures should not be blamed 
for much of  the inflationary trend. One reason is  that while MMC targets generate instability, 
they imparted an inflationary bias to Fed policy only to the extent either that the Fed is  more 
reluctant to reverse a too expansionary policy than a too restrictive policy, or that prices react 
more strongly to excess demand than to deficient demand. While both conditions probably 
existed to some extent, the net effect of MMC targets on the inflationary trend is likely to have 
been small. Moreover, current operating procedures are not all that different from those of the 
1970s, and yet the Fed has succeeded in controlling inflation.  Similarly, the Bank of Japan 
has used such operating procedures succ:essfully (See Cargill and Hutchison, 1990). 
Table 2 shows the regressions of the M-1 and M-2 growth rates on the FOMC's intentions 
as measured by  Boschen and Mills' (1995) policy index which is  based on their reading of the 
Minutes. This Table should be treated with some caution because monthly growth rates of 
money are measured with large errors, and because the policy index is  not cointegrated with 
the growth rate of  M-1 and perhaps not with the growth rate of M-2. 
With these qualifications Table 2 shows that in the first period the sum of  the coefficients 
for both M- 1 and M-2 is large enough 1.0  suggest that the Fed's operating procedures did allow 
the Fed to exert a strong enough impact on the growth rate of  money. But for M-1 the low  R~ shows that its control over that impact was very loose. For M-2 R2 is  much  higher, but the 
sum of  the coefficients is, if  anything, les!j than for M-1. However, experiments with different 
lags show that the relative size of  the sum of coefficients is very sensitive to the (essentially 
arbitrary) number of lags included. 
In the second period the growth rate of  M-l is  unrelated to the policy index. By  contrast, 
the growth rate of  M-2 is  related to the policy index, but with a smaller coefficient and a lower 
R2 than in  the first period. It may seem surprising at first that the FOMCVs  control over the 
monetary growth rate appears to be  less  in the second period when the FOMC claimed to be 
paying more attention to it than it be:fore. But that may  be merely the result of OLS bias. If  the 
FOMC saw the monetary growth rate rising and expected the rise to continue, it might respond 
by  adopting a restrictive policy, thus generating a negative correlation between the policy 
index and the monetary growth rate. The Fed was more likely to act this way in  the second 
period than in the first period. The probable existence of  reverse causation also suggests that 
for both periods Table 2 underestimates the effects of  policy actions on the monetary growth 
rate. 
Starting in October 1972 the Blue Books contain additional evidence against the hypothesis 
that poor operating techniques were a major factor in the Great Inflation.  They give the 
FOMC's target ranges for M-1 and  M-2, along with its current estimate of  the actual growth 
rates of  M-1 and  M-2, so that one can calculate the FOMC's misses of  its monetary targets. 
Negative errors largely offset positive errors, so that the net error for M-1 is only 0.3 percent 
(with a standard deviation of 3.1 percent). and for M-2 it is 0.5 percent (with a standard 
deviation of 2.1 percent). 
A more likely reason for the high inflation than the MMC targeting procedure is  the 
FOMC's reluctance to let interest rates rise as the IS  curve shifted outward. Even if  the FOMC 
had  kept the M-1 and M-2 growth rates exactly on its target its policy would still have been 
inflationary if  it had set these targets too high because it did not want the funds rate to rise 
sharply. 
It may seem bizarre that the FOMC would give short-run stabilization of  the federal funds rate priority over controlling the monetary growth rate, but  it becomes less 
bizarre when considered in the context of the thinking at the time, with its insufficient 
emphasis or1  the role of  money  in inflation, and concern about measurement errors in  money 
growth. In any case, there are a number of passages in the Minutes,  as well as in  the reports of 
an  important FOMC committee, the Committee on the Directive, that show that the FOMC 
was  willing to sacrifice control of  money growth in order to stabilize the funds rate. 
V. COGNITIVE ERRORS 
We  generally assume that agents operate rationally. While this is  a useful assumption for many 
purposes it is  less helpful when considering the behavior of an organization insulated from 
market pressures. Several cognitive errors characterized Fed thinking in the 1960s and 1970s. 
One was vagueness, that is the absence of  a thought-through view of how monetary policy 
operates. William  McChesney Martin, who was chairman from April 1951 to January 1970 
distrusted economic analysis. Robert Hetzel (1995, p. 2) states that he  "valued individuals whci 
could offer anecdotal information about economic activity more highly than economists.  " 
Sherman Maisel (1973, p. 170) reports that Martin distrusted quantification. His successor, 
Arthur Burns, was certainly not opposed to quantification, but he  was  "always suspicious of  all 
embracing economic theories (Wells, 1994, p.  24), stressed the uniqueness of each particular 
situation, and considered econometric nlodels to be  "bankrupt" (cited in  Hargrove and Morley, 
1984, p. 121). 
Whether the econometrics and economic theory available at the time deserved more 
credence than the FOMC gave it is  not a settled issue. But the vagueness of  the FOMC's 
analysis might be part of  the explanation of  the inflation. Reliance on intuition suffers from the 
problem that intuition might be  influenced by  wishes to an even greater extent than is 
economic analysis. Permitting interest rates to rise sharply and generating a recession is a 
painful decision, and if  one does not use a formal model it is easier to convince oneself that 
one does not need  to do so. 
Another relevant cognitive problem is  procrastination. The conditions under which the 
FOMC operates invite procrastination. Like other organizations it is  subject to a natural tendency to put off painful decision~s  whose need cannot be unequivocally established. As  Janis 
and Mann (1977, p. 207) have pointed out, when an organization is aware of  the losses its 
decisions will cause, and has no hope of  finding a good solution - which was certainly the 
situation of  the FOMC on  many oclcasions - it tends to procrastinate. In addition, the FOMC is 
confronted with an immense amount of  information, and that, too, might lead to 
procrastination (Vertzberger, 1990, p. 86). Moreover, the high degree of uncertainty under 
which it operates provides a rationa.le for postponing decisions until the next meeting when 
additional data will be available. And, of course, the same is then true again at that meeting.  It 
is  therefore not surprising that the Minutes contain several complaints about procrastination.3 
Procrastination may have p1aye:d some role in the inflation. To a large extent the effects of 
procrastination on the inflation rate tend to cancel since it means that both periods of  tightness, 
as well as periods of  ease start too late and end too late. But since tightening monetary policy 
is a more painful decision than is easing policy. procrastination probably biased policy in  an 
inflationary direction. Moreover, if excessive delay  in abandoning a restrictive policy 
generated a recession, or made an ongoing recession more severe, then the Fed  is  more likely 
to have been pressed more strongly to change this policy than is true in  the opposite case. 
Apart from procrastination the FOMG also tended to over-emphasize short run 
considerations, something that is  ha.rdly unique to the Fed. As  Vertzberger (1990, p. 21 1) 
explains: 
Organizations deal with ambiguity by avoiding it.  Consequently 
information dealing with general or long-term developments receives 
little attention compared to information dealing with the specific and 
current. Information about long-term developments that does not suggest 
clear, immediate deadlines is easier to ignore or postpone dealing with. 
Thus, as late as 1972 the FOMC's targets for the monetary aggregates were for relatively 
short periods ahead, one and two quarters, though by  1973 it  may have thought of  its long-run 
aggregates targets as applying to twelve months - the evidence on this is conflicting. Only  in 
April 1975, when a congressional reso1ul:ion (C.R. 133) required it  to do so, did  it formally set 
its long-run targets for a year. The FOMC's short-run focus drew much criticism, not only 
from academic economists, but also from FOMC members themselves. The former FOMC officials I  interviewed split on the question whether procrastination and a short-run focus 
created serious problems. 
Another problem was that  if'  the lag in  the effect of  monetary policy shown by  our 
econometric models is correct, then in  the 1960s and  1970s the FOMC substantially 
underestimated the length of  the lag. Many FOMC members estimated the lag at only 6 to 9 
months. (Such a lag is  more or less in  line with academic estimates made in the 1950s and 
1960s, though much shorter than the lag that modern econometric models show.) However, it 
seems that Chairman Martin thought that the lag was much shorter. The interviews suggest that 
the FOMC' as a whole underestimated the lag, and was reluctant to accept the evidence for 
long lags shown by the Fed's own econometric model, in which for a long time the FOMC 
showed little trust. 
Like procrastination, underestimation of  the lag should primarily generate instability rather 
than  inflatl~on.  But, as discussed above, due to asymmetries increased instability is  likely to 
raise the inflation rate. 
Another potential cognitive problem is a failure to distinguish between nominal and real 
interest rates. There are statements in the Minutes that do draw this distinction, but  it is  far 
from clear whether the FOMC paid enough attention to this.  Failure to distinguish, 
consistently in practice, between nominal and real rates, and hence to forget about the Fisher 
effect, could partly explain why the FOMC  usually stayed with  its funds rate target even if  ~t 
meant letting the growth rate of  money exceed its target. 
A further error was that the FOMC did not appreciate enough how  its willingness to let 
money grow at too high a rate was generating inflation. In part, this reflected the mainstream 
view of  the economics profession at the time, and should therefore not be considered a 
"cognitive error", as  I am  using the term here.  But  it was also due to the specific way  in 
which  the FOMC looked at the monetary growth rate. Although FOMC members would hake 
agreed that in  the long run the growth rate of  money was determined by  the growth rate of 
reserves, on a day-to-day basis they considered it to be determined by  the demand for bank 
credit and money, and thought of themselves as merely supplying the reserves that the banks need. 
In part, that was due the FOMC's short- run focus. If  the demand for loans and money 
increases then banks usually have enough excess reserves to raise the growth rate of money 
substantially for a week or a month at what, when expressed in annualized terms corresponds 
to a substantial rate. And  with its focus on  the short run, what the FOMC saw front and center 
was banks needing additional reserves to meet their immediate obligations. And  in the short 
run  it makes sense to supply these reserves to avoid a financial stringency. 
In part, the belief that money demand determines the rate of  monetary growth was also 
due to the Fed's control procedure. It tried to control the money stock from the demand side 
by  setting the funds rate at a level that will induce the public to demand the quantity of  money 
that the Fed wants to have outstanding, and to provide banks with the reserves they need to 
support that level of deposits. Given such a policy it is  natural to view changes in the money 
stock as due to changes in the demand for money, and to look for idiosyncratic factors, such a 
bunching of  tax  payments, to explain changes in  the money supply. In much of  the Fed's 
thinking the money supply was  (and presumably still is) referred to as though  it were 
something determined by the private sector, and not by  the Fed  itself. Such a framework does 
not foster a realization of  the importance of controlling the growth rate of  money if  one wants 
to control inflation. 
This list of  cognitive problems does not include something that many economists might 
expect to find on such a list, insufficient attention to expectations. That was not a problem. 
The FOMC paid a great deal of  attention to expectations, though, of course it did not talk 
about rational expectations.  . 
V. POLITICAL PRESSURES 
The Fed's freedom to determine monetary policy is  limited by  pressures from both the 
Administration and Congress. The extent of  presidential influence on monetary policy is a 
subtle issue on which there is considerable disagreement. At  one extreme is  Robert 
Weintraub's (1978, p. 350) statement that: "in each administration monetary policy fitted harmoniously with the President's economic and financial objectives and plans. " (However, in 
the year following the publication of his paper this rule was broken.) William Greider (1987, 
p. 184), too, argues that the President has great power over the Fed. 
But a leading authority on the Fed., John Woolley, (1984, p. 1  1 I), takes a more moderate 
position, writing:  "Rather than conclude that presidents generally get the monetary policy they 
want, it would be more accurate to say that only infrequently, are presidents extremely 
unhappy with the monetary polic:y they get." Two former Fed insiders also stress White House 
influence. Maisel (1973, pp. 24, 147) describes Fed independence as "both ill-defined and 
circumscribed. .  .  . In time any president can make certain that his views will prevail.  ,  .  . [I]t is 
clear that no body.. . can continue to function well under an all-out attack by the 
Administration. " Andrew Brimm~er  (1995, p. 7) writes: "The record shows that (with only a 
few exceptions) presidents or their aids - from President Wilson through President Bush - have 
tried to capture or greatly influence monetary policy." 
Others have attributes more power and autonomy to the Fed, since it has striven in various 
ways to develop strong political support in the financial industry, and to foster its image as the 
guardian of sound money. (See Pierce, 1990.) At a time when it is perceived as fighting 
inflation, while the President is seen as weak on inflation, it has a strong constituency to back 
it. According to Schultze: 
whenever the President has a strong anti-inflationary policy of his own 
.  .  . he can argue publicly with the Fed. He could go on television and say 
that these willful men ar~e  destroying us. He would win. But if  the Fed 
has the only anti-inflationary game in town the President can't do 
anything about it. (cited in Hargrove and Morley, 1984, p. 499) 
Comments by two of the people I  interviewed, Lyle Gramley and Eliot Swan, also 
indicate that the Fed is able to resist presidential pressure for expansionary policies. All in all, 
well informed observers differ substantially in their judgments about the President's power 
over monetary policy 
If  presidents have such power one way they might use it is to generate political business 
cycles. But political-business-cycle theory can explain why inflation was so much greater in 
the 1965-79 period only if  there were some evidence that political business cycles were then unusually frequent or strong. And, indeed, there is  much  more persuasive evidence for a 
political business cycle in the 1972 election than in  other elections (see Woolley , 1995), 
though a number of  people I interviewed denied that Burns' policy in 1971 and 1972 was 
politically motivated. In any case, at least the direct effect of a higher monetary growth rate 
before the election cannot account for much of the sharp rise in the price level between 1965 
and 1979 because it lasted only a short time.. 
Presidential pressure is  not confined to election years. President Johnson had  a strong 
ideological commitment to low  interest rates, and Herbert Stein notes that even President 
Nixon was  "always wary of the Federal Reserve and .  . the bankers." (Cited in Hargrove and 
Morley, 1984, p. 366) To what extent such pressures influenced the FOMC is hard to say. 
Unsurprisingly the Minutes, at least for the 1965.01 - 1976.03 period, contain few indications 
of  such presidential influencc4 Perhaps this is  an issue discussed more over lunch than at 
official meetings. Or perhaps the  Pres~dernt's  influence operates without being discussed. 
One can make a case that, quite apart from a possible political business cycle in the 1972 
election, the Fed was more constrained in curbing inflation by White House pressures in the 
1965-1979 period than at other times since the restoration of  its autonomy in early 1953. 
Hetzel (1995 p. 5) argues that in the  1950s the high  inflation rate during the Korean War 
subsequently made control of  inflation the: macroeconomic focus of the political system. 
Hargrove and Morley (1984, p. 26), too, argue that the first priority of the Eisenhower 
administration was to hold down inflation and protect the dollar. Moreover, as Havrilesky 
(1993, pp. 53-55) points out, the Exsenhower administration was disinclined to put pressure on 
the Fed. In 1960 and 1961 the Kennedy administration did press the Fed to ease policy for a 
time, but ceased to do so in 1962 when  it became more concerned about the balance of 
payments deficit. (Havrilesky, 1993, pp. 56-57) 
By  contrast, in  the 1965-79 period there were more instances of  White House pressure for 
ease. From 1964 until early 1967 the Johnson administration urged the Fed to be more 
expansionary. Then from early 1969 until 1970 the Nixon Administration wanted the Fed to be 
more restrictive, but after that it argued for ease. In 1974 there were again some months of presidential pressure to tighten. After that, the Ford administration left the Fed  more or less 
alone. The Carter Administration then urged the Fed to towards ease. 
After the Volcker revolution the Reagan Administration initially pressured the Fed to be 
more restrictive. Subsequently, under the influence of supply siders it favored ease, as was 
also true of  the Bush  Administration (Havrilesky, 1993, pp. 62-69).  My general impression  is 
that the Clinton Administration has not pressured the Fed  much. 
All in all, this record strongby suggests that the White House pressed the Fed  much  less 
towards expansion before 1965 than in  the 1965-79 period. Whether such pressure was also 
less after 1979 is not as clear, but  that seems highly likely. In any case, since nominal interest 
rates were higher in  the post-1979 period the fact that the Fed was then not under much greater 
pressure to ease shows that the White House was  much  more willing to tolerate what many 
perceived as a highly restrictive policies after 1979 than it had  been previously. 
There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which the Fed responds to pressure 
from Congress. That pressure, too, may have been greater in the early part of  the 1965-79 
period, because of  the strong easy-money stance of  Representative Patman, a Texas populist 
who was then chairman of  the main House Committee overseeing the ~ed.~ 
It is  therefore correct to say that the Fed  had  less leeway to follow a restrictive policy  in 
the 1965-79 period than in  the immedia.tely prior or subsequent periods. But all of  these 
pressures were subsidiary and  not  the dominant cause of  the inflationary policies. The Minutes 
do not show the FOMC straining at the leash, eager to adopt more restrictive policies than 
were politically feasible. Although the type of statements that such a situation would elicit do 
appear occasionally in the Minutt>s,  they do not characterize them. Similarly, the picture that 
emerges from interviews with CEA chairmen (Hargrove and Morley, 1984) is  not one of  the 
Fed continually testing the political constraints in  its efforts to control inflation. One might say 
that the FOMC was nudged in  the direction of  inflation, but a nudge is  not a shove. 
All  the same, while it would therefore be wrong to depict the FOMC as the helpless 
victim of  political pressures, had  the FOMC adopted a much more restrictive policy than it 
actually did, it could well have run into insuperable political obstacles. So we have here a problem of what might be called  "layered causes".  One can call political pressures the major 
"back-stop" cause of  the inflation - that is a potential cause that did not come into operation, 
but would have been determinative if  other causes not done the job first - as well as one of 
several contributory causes in  the more usual sense of the term. 
VI. Wage and Price Controls 
The wage and price controls that were introduced in August 1971 and completely eliminated 
only in  April 1974, affected monetary policy in several ways. On  the one hand, they lowered 
price expectations of  households, though not those of economists (Gramlich, 1983), and thus 
reduced the inflation rate. On the other hand, wage-price controls made it more difficult for 
the Fed to follow a sufficiently restrictive policy because.  their existence reduces the 
perceived need  for a restrictive monetary policy. A major purpose of  the controls - and a 
reason why Burns had advocated them - was to take some of  the pressure off the Fed. If  the 
Fed  tightens monetary policy  until the marginal benefit from reducing inflation is equal to the 
marginal cost of  tightening, any reduction in  inflation brought about by controls should induce 
the Fed to become less restrictive. Moreover, beyond such rational considerations, the 
existence of  controls may well  have induced an unjustified mood of  relaxation at the Fed. 
Stein (1995, p. 67), who was then chairman of  the CEA, reports that the seeming initial 
success of controls did  "seduce us  into excessively expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. " 
Similarly, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Review describes the December  197  1 and 
January 1972 Directives as indicating that:  "with the existence of  a price-wage control 
program, the Committee gave greater weight to providing the growth of  money and credit 
which they viewed as essential to real economic recovery." Similarly, William Poole (1975, p. 
102), who was on the Board staff at the time, cites faith in wage and price controls as a factor 
that prevented a more restrictive policy between mid-1971 and mid-1973. The interviews 
support such a conclusion. Thus Pierce observes that: "policymakers got very fooled by  wage 
and price controls, .  .  . they thought .  .  . that wage and price controls took care of  the inflation 
problem. " Gramley and Maisel also said  that the existence of wage-price controls affected Fed 
policy. A second way in  which wage and price controls could have inhibited a restrictive 
monetary policy is  that to avoid the impression of  unfairness, control over wages had  to be 
accompanied by efforts to prevent substantial increases in  interest rates and dividends. There 
was therefore the danger that if  the Fed  raised interest rates substantially, price controls would 
be extended to interest rates. 
A third way was Burn's appolintment to the chairmanship of  the Committee on Interest and 
Dividends, the agency charged w:ith constraining interest rates and dividends. This helped 
Burns to protect the Fed from attempts to impose controls on interest rates. But it also imposed 
an at least potential constraint on the Burn's freedom to raise interest rates. 
The net effect of  wage-price controls on the growth rate of  money is  uncertain. But that 
does not necessarily mean that it was trivial. 
VII. Economists' Thinking and the FOMC 
At  one time the Fed  was heavily influenced by  the ideas and attitudes of bankers. But  in the 
1960s and  1970s the  influence of  economists grew as more and  more economists were 
appointed to the Board and to the presidencies of  the Federal Reserve Banks, and as the quality 
of  the Fed's research staff improved greatly. It is therefore possible that a major reason for the 
high inflation was an attitude among economists that discouraged the pursuit of  a sufficiently 
restrictive monetary policy. 
I will therefore look at the opinions of  academic economists on the following issues: the 
existence of an exploitable trade-off between inflation and unemployment, the optimal 
trade-off ratio (if there is a sustai~nable  trade-off), cost-push inflation and the NAIRU. Since 
only one opinion survey of economists is available for the 1965-79 period I will rely largely on 
the opinions expressed in  textbooks. Textbook authors have an obligation to present the 
professional consensus rather thain  just their own idiosyncratic opinions. Moreover presenting 
the consensus rather than stressing idiosyncratic views is a way  to enhance sales. 
Until the work of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) standard macroeconomic models 
implied a long-run unemployment-inflation trade-off (Lucas, 1996, p. 671). It might seem  that 
almost immediately after the publication of  these two papers economists would have rejected the hypothesis of an exploitable trade-off. But that was not so. During the 1970s the 
proposition that the long-run Phillips Curve is  vertical, though appealing on theoretical 
grounds, had  not yet been empirically confirmed. Many  Phillips-curve regressions were run on 
the assumption of extrapolative expectations. Frequently in  these regressions the sum of  the 
coefficients on past inflation rates was significantly below unity, though the later studies did 
tend to have coefficients with sums not significantly below unity. 
Hence it is  not surprising that the feasibility of an unemployment-inflation trade-off was 
taken seriously. Even five years after the publication of  Friedman's presidential address 
Samuelson (1973, p. 835), in  the leading Principles book at the time, told students that, 
although some people think that the choice is  only between having more unemployment now or 
in the future: 
No  statistical evidence establishing so definite a view has yet been 
forthcoming. And  even if  this pessimistic view were to have an element 
of  truth, no doubt many would argue that, in an uncertain world it is 
better to grasp the lower unemployment that can be had at hand than to 
wait for the lower unemployment that, so to speak, can be found only in 
some future bush. 
In a footnote, after stating the argument of  those who believe that the long-run Phillips 
Curve is  vertical, Samuelson dismissed this possibility as follows: "Critics of  these writers say 
that by  the time their proposed equilibrium is  reached the system may  well have been torn 
apart by  voter revolt, urban riots..  . [Moreover, the data from experience] do not yet allow  us 
to judge whether the Phillips curve is  vertical. " (Samuelson, 1973, p. 835n). Lipsey and 
Steiner (1975, p. 831) and McConnell (1969) took a similar  position.  Alchian and  Allen 
( 1972) did  not mention a trade-off, while Bach (1974) was equivocal about its existence. 
I know of  no survey of  economists' opinions during the 1965-1979 period on the trade-off 
ratio of  unemployment against inflation that the central bank should use. But an earlier survey 
published in 1958 asked economists the maximum level of  unemployment they were prepared 
to accept to obtain "a high degree of  price stability. " Excluding the nonresponse category, 20 
percent were not willing to accept more than 4 percent unemployment, 40 percent were not 
willing to accept more than 5 percent and only 27 percent were willing to accept 6 percent unemployment. Asked what to do if price stability and low unemployment are not  "fully 
compatible", three quarters of  the respondents opted for achieving the unemployment goal. 
(U.S. Congr., 1958, pp. 3-4) 
Samuelson (1973, p. 272) pornted out that:  "In mild inflation the wheels of  industry are 
initially  well lubricated, and output is  near capacity. Private investment is brisk, jobs are 
plentiful" and  workers are better off. Although he warned that creeping inflation may 
accelerate into a canter or gallop, he also warned that using monetary and fiscal policy to fight 
cost-push inflation "will only result in  unemployment and stagnation." (Samuelson 1973, p. 
837, emphasis added). He cited "some economists" as saying that we should learn to live with 
creeping inflation, and that "undoubtedly such a solution is better than a masochistic throttling 
down of the economy that puts the burden of fighting inflation on  the marginal workers who 
can least afford to bear that burden." (Samuelson, 1973, pp. 834-35) 
Lipsey and Steiner (1975, pp. 8 15-  16) explained that although unanticipated inflation 
redistributes income arbitrarily, and  under fixed exchange rates creates balance-of-payments 
problems, there is  no evidence that inflation reduces real income. Three other textbooks I 
looked at, Alchian and Allen (1972), Bach  (1974) and  McConnell (1969), do not take an 
unequivocal position on the appropriate trade-off ratio. 
One consideration that made many economist reluctant to advocate restrictive policy was a 
fairly widespread belief that inflation was largely a cost-push phenomenon. In an opinion 
survey that asked economists whether they agreed with the statement that: "The 'Corporate 
State' as depicted by Galbraith [in a book that de-emphasizes the role of atomistic competition 
inn the American economy] accurately describes the context and structure of  the U.S. 
economy", 18 percent of the respondents generally agreed, while another 34 percent agreed 
with reservations. (Kearl et al, 1979). 
In  principle, if  inflation is due to cost-push, that does not prevent the central banks from 
aiming at price stability with cost-push price increases in some industries being offset by 
falling prices in other industries. But economists who think that cost-push is  the major cause of 
inflation generally argue that it would take unacceptable unemployment to reduce the inflation rate significantly. Moreover, countering cost-push inflation by  lowering aggregate demand 
offends one's sense of justice. Why should unorganized workers and workers in competitive 
industries lose their jobs just because unionized workers raise their wages or oligopolistic 
industries raise their prices? Furthermore, they might argue, cost-push inflation is  not the 
Fed's responsibility; its job is  only to ensure that aggregate demand is  neither excessive or 
deficient. Cost-push inflation should be combatted not by  monetary policy, but by  incomes 
policy. Thus Samuelson (1973, pp. 837) wrote that "to cope with cost-push inflation some new 
kind of 'incomes policy' is  now seen to be  needed," and referred to economists who rejected 
income policy as "a minority. " 
The five textbooks tell us nothing about the magnitude of  the NAIRU. But  in 1968 Franco 
Modigliani (1J.S. Congr. 1968, p. 58) summarized the presumably then prevailing estimates of 
the  NAIRU as follows: "Just what ~t is  we do not know precisely. We  know that it is  less than 
five [percent], probably less than four; and are pretty sure that at the present time it is  no less 
than three." In 1972 two leading forecasters, Otto Eckstein and  Roger Brinner (1972, p. 1) put 
the  NAIRU  into the 4 to 4 112  percent range. Seven years later 1979 Michael Wachter (U.S. 
Congr. 1979, p. 124) provided two annual series of  the NAIRU. One set it at 4.65 percent in 
1965 and at 5.55 percent in 1978; the other set it at 5.73 percent in 1965 and 6.40 percent in 
1978. Henry Aaron (1978, pp. 117-18) reports that around 1969 most economists believed that 
a 4 percent unemployment rate would generate an excessive and perhaps accelerating inflat~on 
rate, and that many economists doubted that even 5 percent unemployment was an achievable 
goal. 
Both Arthur Okun and Herbert Stein have argued that economists, or at least those in 
government, tended to underestimate the NAIRU (cited in  Hargrove and Morley, 1984, pp. 
308, 406). Alan Greenspan pointed out that as late as January 1977 the official estimate of the 
NAIRU was 4 percent, but that "very few economists were willing to buy that." (cited in 
Hargrove and Morley, 1984, p. 452). Estimating the NAIRU at 4 percent may  have been 
realistic at one time, but such estimates became and less realistic. 
Let us  now  look at the FOMC's opinions. While the FOMC accepted the existence of  a NAIRU, and hence a limit to the drive for low unemployment, it seems that many  FOMC 
member thought that one had to worry about inflation only when unemployment is low.  But  ~f 
the Fed  is willing to adopt restrictive policies only when unemployment is low enough to raise 
the intlation rate, then the inflation rate will have a tendency to rise secularly. Burns, however 
realized that the price level rises not only at full employment, and  he  exercised great power 
over the FOMC during his chairmanship, February 1970-March 1978.  Hence, the reluctance 
to move against inflation when unemployment is  high may have created a problem only during 
part of the 1965-79 period. The FOMCfs  estimate of the NAIRU was probably higher than 
that of  many academic economisrs, but  if  the recent estimate of Staiger, Stock and Watson 
(1996) is correct, it was still too low. 
The FOMC, on the whole, did not  seem to have believed in a vertical Phillips curve. It 
therefore had  to decide the relative importance it placed on low inflation and balance of 
payments equilibrium on the one hand, and low unemployment on the other. The Minutes 
contain many strong statements about the dangers of  inflation.6 The FOMC also did  not ignore 
the balance of  payments problem, but on the whole, it did not give it a central role. 
Although unemployment was not rnentioned as often as inflation, an incident occurred in 
June 1973 that illustrates how concern about unemployment acted a serious constraint on 
policy options. Although staff eclonomist Partee described the prevailing inflation as  "nearly 
runaway", when his staff looked for different policy options, they ran their model with the 
constraint that the unemploymen~;  rate would not be allowed to exceed 5 percent by  the end of' 
1974. Although Burns responded  that it would not be: "totally unrealistic to aim at 
significantly lower or higher unemployment rates for short periods of  time" (Minutes, June, 
1973, p. 610), this does suggest that the Fed  took unemployment rate seriously. And  in 
December 1974 when the unemployment rate rose sharply (to 6.6 percent in  November) the 
FOMC did shift to a much easier policy, though fear of a financial crisis may have played a 
larger role than unemployment in  this decision. 
All  in all, although in  some years the FOMC showed concern about the high rates of 
unemployment, it expressed even more concern about inflation. That might seem to suggest that  it had a stronger preference for low  inflation than for low unemployment. But  that must be 
interpreted in  its historical context. The FOMC was so concerned about high inflation because 
the inflation rate was so extraordinarily high. Hence this concern was consistent with a 
willingness to live with a much higher inflation rate than would usually have been tolerated 
previously. 
It is not surprising that as the inflation rate accelerated the Fed's tolerance for inflation 
increased. What was considered acceptable in, say 1976 would have been considered totally 
unacceptable in 1965. To a substantial extent that was rational since expectations had changed, 
and expected inflation is much less damaging than unexpected inflation. Another factor that 
explains the FOMC's greater tolerance of  inflation after 1973, and was surely a major part of 
the explanation after that date, is, of course, the occurrence of  major supply shocks in 
1973-74.  Trying to bring the 12.2 percent inflation rate of  1974 down to, say 4 percent within 
a year would have required a rise in  unemployment unacceptable not only to the FOMC but 
also to the political authorities and to the public. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Thus, several factors appear responsible for the high  inflation, quite apart from the supply 
shocks. One potential factor, forecast errors, can be ruled out as a major cause; that played 
only a minor role. Inefficient operating procedures, too, had only a small effect. What was 
more important was the FOMC's great reluctance to change sufficiently the setting of  its 
interest rate target. Cognitive errors, such as vague thinking, a tendency to procrastinate, 
insufficient appreciation of  both the lag  in monetary policy and of  the importance of  the 
monetary growth rate, and inadequate attention to the distinction between nominal and real 
interest rates also played a part. 
Political pressures played some role. But their role was limited by  the fact that for its own 
reasons the FOMC usually wanted to stop well short of  the bounds these limits set. 
Had  the FOMC tried to follow a much  more resolute anti-inflation policy, then political 
pressures might well have emerged as the main  "cause", other than supply shocks. The 
imposition of  wage and price control probably had  some effect, but it  is  not certain in  which direction. 
Finally, there was the intellectual atmosphere, or more specifically the received doctrine 
of  macroeconomics. By  and large, economists did not consider inflation a disaster and  were 
more concerned about unemployment. Belief in  the prevalence of  cost-push inflation and  the 
near impotence of  monetary policy in that situation, while not the dominant view, were an 
influential view. Moreover, only slowly did the absence of  a long-run inflationlunemployment 
trade off became widely accepted, at least as far as one can judge from textbooks. 
Furthermore, if  the FOMC did underestimate the NAIRU in  the later part of  the period it was 
in  good company. 
In such a situation it  would have been difficult for the FOMC to have pursued a policy 
that was much more restrictive than the policy it did pursue. The temptation to listen to the 
experts, both on its staff and  in academia must have been strong. Moreover, it would have 
meant adopting a policy contrary to what many FOMC members had  been taught as students 
(and some had  themselves taught prior to their appointment to the Fed). In addition, 
economists would have lambasted the Fed at congressional Hearings and  in the media, thus 
helping to mobilize political pressure against it. 
Such a listing of  various factors that caused the Fed to pursue a highly inflationary policy 
does not exhaust what can be said about the reasons for this policy. It is  useful to step back 
and look at the Fed's decision in a broader framework. In doing so one must preserve the 
distinction between what we  know today, and what the Fed could reasonably be expected to 
have known at the time. 
One can then tell the following story:  The low inflation rate in  the early years of  the long 
expansion that started in  February 19611  lulled the Fed into complacency, so that when the 
inflation rate did rise it  was slow to recognize the problem. When it finally did step sharply on 
the brake the resulting 1969-70 recession came close to setting off a financial crisis, which 
may have made the Fed reluctant later on to become sharply restrictive. Then came the 
unprecedented supply shocks of  1972-74, for which  neither experience nor the macroeconomic 
literature provided adequate guidance. The Fed's first response to the 1972-74 supply shocks was therefore not coherent. When a sharply restrictive policy produced much  pain  it was 
replaced by  an expansionary policy before it could succeed in preventing the sharp price 
increases of  1972-74 from being incorporated to a substantial extent into inflationary 
expectations, and hence into base-line inflation. As  a result, the intlation rate for 1976-79 was 
both  high and accelerating, until it was broken with much pain by  the Volcker disintlation. 
One might go further and argue that with the U.S. never having experienced a substantial 
inflation other than  in  association with a major war, one could hardly expect the Fed  to be 
vigilantly on guard against such a contingency. Instead, the formative economic experience of 
most, or perhaps all of those who made policy or advised on policy had been the Great 
Depression. A "never-again" attitude towards that event could readily have generated a too 
dismissive attitude towards what was thought of  as the opposite danger, inflation. With people 
learning primarily from their own experience, rather than from "theory" and might-have- 
beens, perhaps, sooner or later, a major intlation was inevitable. ENDNOTES 
1. Moreover, the assumption made by  the older version of this theory, that the central bank 
tries to offset the reduction in  the supply of  effort that taxes and various safety-net programs 
cause, does not sounds plausible to anyone to who has spent much time reading the Minutes of 
the FOMC. The other variant, that central banks generate inflation to reduce unemployment in 
the short run is  observationally equivalent on most tests to the hypothesis that the central bank 
underestimates the NAIRU. 
2. Suppose, for example, that a reaction function tells us  that, cateris paribus, the Fed raises 
the funds rate by  more in response to a one percent rise in  the CPI than  it does in  response to a 
$50 billion rise in the balance of payments deficit. That does not tell us that it considers such a 
rise in  the CPI to be worse than the rise in  the deficit. Instead, it may  raise the funds rate more 
because it thinks that it takes a bigger increase in the funds rate to reverse a one percent rise in 
the CPI than to reverse a $10 billion increase in the deficit. In other words, the coefficients of 
a Fed reaction function measures a combination of  the Fed's utility function and its production 
function. Hence, while a Fed reaction function might explain why the Fed raised the funds rate 
at a particular time, it does not allow us  to infer the Fed's preferences, and hence explain its 
tolerance for inflation. 
3. See Minutes, 1965, pp.  1 112,  1;!70-71,1972, 807. 4. For exceptions see Minutes, 1965, pp. 
11  12-13, 1272-73, 1975, pp. 518, 5260. 
5. Finally, there was also an indirect source of political influence FOMC members argued that 
if  the Fed adopted a too restrictive policy Congress would  respond to the ensuing recession by 
adopting too expansionary fiscal policies. 
6. See Minutes 1965, p. 1112; 1968, pp. 460-61; 1971, p. 553; 1973, pp. 403 and 506; 1974, 
pp. 214, 367, 390, 393, 742, 1024, 1036, 1048, 1123.) REFERENCES 
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Forecast Errors of FOMC Staff 
Mean error 
Mean absolute error 
Mean error 
Mean absolute error 
Mean error 
Mean absolute error 
Mean Error 
Mean absolute error 
Current  Quarters ahead: 
quarl:era  1  2  3  4 




. :LO  -32  .74  1.15  1.63 
.  27  .52  .96  1.40  1.87 
Excluding 1973.1 -  1974.3' 
.  05  .16  .39  .58  -91 




.  01  -.I4  -.54 -1.03  -1.47 
.36  .73  1.07  1.46  1.88 
Excluding 1973.1 -  1974.3C 
.  06  .02  -.lo  -.22  -.47 




Mean error  - .04  -.08  -.I1  -.04  -.03 
Mean absolute error  - .08  .26  .42  .53  .66 
Excluding 1973.1 -  1974.3' 
Mean Error  - .04  - .07  - .14  - .14  - .16 
Mean absolute error  .  08  .25  .36  .45  .56 
Defense Expenditures 
Billions of Dollars 
Whole periodb 
Mean error  - .I35  -.20  -.40  -.54  -.77 
Mean absolute error  . 93  1.51  1.91  1.94  2.44 
a. Forecasts were made late in this quarter, except in one case 
in which they were made earl-y in the next quarter. 
b.  The earliest quarter forecast for the GNP deflator is 1967.1, 
for real GNP it is 1966.4,  for the unemployment rate and defense 
expenditures it is  1966.3.  'The  last quarter forecast used for 
the "current quarter" is 1979.2,  As the forecast horizon is leng- 
thened by a quarter,  a quarter at the end of the period is lost. 
For the deflator and for real GNP some quarters had to be omitted 
due to a major GNP revision creating a problem in deriving the deflator from the Green Book data. The number of available fore- 
casts decreases as the length of the forecast increases.  Data for 
5 quarter forecasts are based on relatively small samples. 
c. Quarters denote those in which the forecast was made, not 
those to which the forecast applies. Table 2 
Regression of Annualized Monetary Growth Rates on Policy Index 
Coefficient/t value  Sum  R~/D-W 
La57  1  2  3  4  5  6 
(months) 
NOTES: All regressions include constant and first order lagged depend.ent 
variable. R~ is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
Source: Based on data obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
bulletin board. Fig.1  Inflation Rate (CPI) 1800 -  1990 Fig.2  Inflation Rate (CPI)  1'950-1995 
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